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SOC and AI Agents: Distinguishing Between Attacks and Legitimate Activity

AI Tools·Tom Levy·

SOC and AI Agents: Distinguishing Between Attacks and Legitimate Activity

SOC and AI Agents: Distinguishing Between Attacks and Legitimate Activity
Key Takeaways
1AI agents generate accurate alerts on authorized tasks
2Traditional detection models no longer always distinguish between attacks and legitimate activity
3CISOs must govern the identity of agents, adapt investigations, and track true benign positives
Why it matters : Organizations that can qualify intent at machine speed will maintain visibility and trust in an automated environment.

The rapid and parallel behaviors of AI agents trigger accurate alerts but are related to authorized tasks. To avoid blind spots, CISOs must equip their teams to qualify intent at machine speed, rethink investigations, and govern the identity of agents.

Volumes of Accurate but Legitimate Alerts Require a New Interpretation

AI agents generate significant activity for the SOC, and many alerts resulting from their operations correspond to accurate detections of behaviors that are nonetheless authorized. The operational center must evolve towards a model focused on rapid interpretation, capable of establishing whether an event is authorized or risky. For an authorized case, the investigation must demonstrate that an identified agent acted under an approved identity, within the framework of a valid task, and without deviation. For a risky case, it must specify where the activity exceeds the expected perimeter and why a human review or containment is required. This level of clarity helps preserve sensitive detections, concentrate analysts on situations requiring judgment, and establish trust through visible evidence, explicit accountability, and measurable outcomes. AI agents are changing the notion of normal behavior; anticipating these effects allows for maintaining visibility and governance, while trusted machines may present activities similar to those of attackers. Organizations capable of quickly recovering intent will more effectively differentiate legitimate activity from intrusion.

When an Agent's Activity Resembles an Attack

Coding, support, or orchestration agents can massively open files, authenticate to multiple systems, or inventory cloud resources in just seconds. For endpoint, identity, or cloud security controls, these sequences of actions evoke reconnaissance, credential collection, lateral movement, or exfiltration. Solutions then correctly detect typical attack signals while the agent executes an approved mission. This benign true positive, linked to accurate detections of legitimate machine activities, challenges the historical assumption that such behaviors immediately imply suspicion, an assumption shaped by slower, narrower, and less autonomous human systems.

AI Agents Analyze Multiple Systems Simultaneously

Current detections rely on human activity models, while agents collect broad context, act in parallel, and traverse systems according to their objectives. The resulting telemetry corresponds to the signals targeted by tools, leading to technically accurate alerts. Teams must determine whether an authorized task, a compromised agent, altered instructions, stolen credentials, or attacker mimicry is observed. Overly broad suppressions would reduce noise at the cost of blind spots, especially since adversaries will attempt to exploit trusted agent identities, validated workflows, and recognized machine rhythms to conceal themselves.

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What Evidence to Collect to Qualify an Event

Tools monitor processes, file access, authentications, API calls, and connections, but intent can only be determined by considering context. Identifying the agent's owner, the mission assigned to it, its initiator, the systems and data it had access to, as well as compliance with its permissions, is necessary. It is also essential to establish whether its instructions have been modified by a user, a process, or an external input. This information is spread across identities, agent orchestration platforms, the cloud, business applications, ticketing tools, and the security stack. Reconstruction requires correlation and traceability of the intended purpose. With possibly thousands of agents, it is impossible for analysts to reconstruct everything manually; therefore, investigation tools capable of restoring intent at machine speed and providing evidence-based conclusions are needed.

Governing the Identity and Lifecycle of Agents

Each agent must be assigned to a responsible individual, have a specific purpose, possess appropriate identifiers, and have documentation regarding its access. The SOC must associate each action with a workflow, a request, or a business process that triggered it. This involves cataloging active agents, controlling their lifecycle, conducting access reviews, validating sensitive actions, and tracing operations back to the responsible person. The use of shared accounts and excessive rights hinders investigation and quarantine. Conversely, dedicated identities for specific uses and traceability of task origins provide the necessary context for detecting abuse.

Equipping Investigation and Evolving Skills

Leaders must ensure that their stack aggregates evidence from endpoint, identity, cloud, network, SaaS, and agent layers. A useful system reconstructs the sequence, contextualizes, documents gaps, and explains its reasoning. AI investments in the SOC should aim for credible collection, inter-system correlation, adaptive reasoning, and clear escalation when trust is insufficient. On the organizational side, analysts will increasingly pilot hybrid human-machine investigation systems; their expertise defines boundaries, exceptions, detection logic, and context. Investment is needed in detection engineering, threat hunting, identity governance, and agent oversight, allowing them time and authority to address recurring collisions, adjust access, improve workflows, and challenge automated conclusions. Each benign true positive must be leveraged as operational learning.

First Steps: Map, Connect, Test, Monitor

The first step is to map the locations where agents are already active. Many organizations will discover uses introduced by development tools, SaaS platforms, local automations, or enterprise applications with agent functions. Next, ownership of agents, identities, access rights, task origins, and existing rules must be associated with security operations. Teams are required to verify the response of controls against typical agent workflows and categorize benign true positives into a distinct category during exploitation.

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